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The principal conclusion of this paper is that the generic pattern for the optimal
income tax schedule is that of a monononically rising marginal tax rate. The
belief that the marginal rate should decline to zero at the upper end of the
scale is not supported. The results hold for high and low elasticities of labor-
leisure substitution, and for additive as well as strictly concave welfare functions.
Differences between the conclusions of this paper and those of previous writers
are due primarily to careful interpretation and analysis of the optimal solution,
rather than differences between the models, although these exist.
January 26, 1993
1. Introduction
Determining the income tax schedule is one of the most important public policy
decisions made by modern governments, full of major political and economic
consequences. Myths abound, yet the contributions of economists to date have
tended to be incomplete or inconclusive, even confusing. The purpose of the
present paper is to re-examine the problem, which has lately been neglected1.
Mirrlees (1971), in his seminal paper on optimal income tax with labor-leisure
substitution, concluded that the optimal marginal tax rate would be everywhere
in the range (0,1) but that ' . . . it is not possible to say in general whether
marginal tax rates should be higher for high-income, low-income, or intermediate
income groups'. For a specific model he choose as an example, he found the
tax to be nearly linear, with marginal rates tending to fall rather than rise.
Because of the relative ease of solution, much work has been done on properties
of optimal linear income taxes. Examples include Sheshinski (1972), Itsumi
(1974), Romer (1976), Stern (1976), Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Helpman
and Sadka (1978), but these throw only faint light on the shape of more general
tax functions. However Sheshinski (1989) solved for an optimal two-bracket
piecewise linear tax and showed that the marginal rate for the higher bracket
was at least as great as that for the lower, thereby suggesting that nondecreasing
marginal rate might be optimal in general.
However it has been argued that the marginal tax rate should be zero at the top
end of an income distribution of finite range, a result clearly not consistent with
a monotonic nondecreasing marginal rate. Versions of this argument appear in
Phelps (1973), Sadka (1976), Stern (1976), Seade (1977), Cooter (1978), and
Weymark (1987). This proposition is not supported by the results given here.
Since belief in the zero marginal tax proposition is widely held2, largely because
of an appealing intuitive argument apparently in its favor, the Appendix to the
paper is devoted to a brief analysis of why the argument fails to hold.
In the optimal income tax problem, the policymaker must set an income tax
schedule t(z) which optimizes his view of community welfare, given that indi-
vidual households react to the schedule by choosing levels of taxable activity
which optimize their private well-being. It is this problem of incentive compat-
ibility that makes the determination of the optimal income tax inherently more
difficult than that of choosing an optimal wealth or endowment tax, assuming
full information about households in both cases. In addition to the compound
optimization, the problem has other complications:
• Both levels of optimization are potentially constrained.
• The population has a "natural" distribution in terms of resources and/or
xThe incentive to clarify the the situation arose from work by the author on optimal
politically feasible tax-expenditure programs.
2Slemrod (1990), p.164, is a representative expression of both the belief and the discomfort
with it.
skills as independent variable, but the solution is the tax as a function of
income. The relationship between a household's optimal income and its
endowment depends, however, on the tax function, which is the unknown.
• Since we are interested in the shape of the optimal tax schedule, we must
avoid imposing prior restrictions that directly influence it3. Furthermore,
it is not sufficient merely to determine the sign of the marginal tax rate4 —
we cannot consider the problem solved unless we can provide reasonable
clues as to its direction of change.
2. Households
Households are assumed to have identical neoclassical utility functions u(x,Q,
where x is disposable market income made up of earned market income z less
tax t(z) on that income, plus any "grant" g from the government, and £ is
nonmarket income (including leisure). Only resource endowments u, which are
measured in efficiency units, vary between households. The endowments, which
can include human capital and financial resources, can be transformed by the
individual into either market or nonmarket income at a constant 1:1 rate of
transformation. Thus x — z — t{z) + g and (, = u — z.
This formulation is different and perhaps slightly more general than the more
traditional one in which resources, measured in units such as time, do not vary
between households, but there are skill or wage differences which determine the
rate of transformation into market income. In the present formulation, higher
skill is reflected in generating nonmarket income (leisure, home production, tax
avoidance) as well as market income, and the shadow price of leisure is wealth-
neutral.
The household is assumed to optimize its choice between market and non-market
income, subject to a budget constraint which includes the tax function. For-
mally:
max u(x, O, subject to: x + £ <u> + g — T(X), X > g, £ > 0 (1)
where r(x) is the tax as a function of x.
If T(X) uniformly convex, the feasible set is convex. Since the maximand is
strictly quasiconcave, there is a unique solution which can be fully interior or
a corner solution. If T(X) is not convex, the feasible set will not be convex and
there is an interior solution only if the indifference curves are more curved than
the boundary of the set (low substitutability between market and nonmarket
income).
3Fair (1971), uses a nonlinear tax but restricts it to a specific form t(z) — a log(l + z),
with only one parameter.
4
 Shown to be positive or nonnegative over a wide class of models. See Mirrlees (1971),
Phelps (1973), R6ell(l985), Romer (1976), Seade (1982), among others.
Since x = z — t(z) + g, it is easily shown that r' and T" have the same signs as
t',t", provided t' < 1, so uniform convexity of t(z) (a nondecreasing marginal
tax rate) is sufficient to guarantee a unique solution. If the tax function is
nonconvex, problems may arise.
To obtain the most clearcut results, we want to investigate the optimal tax
schedule for a continuum of households with identical utility functions but dif-
fering endowment levels. We want to separate, as far as possible, labor-leisure
substitution effects from income and other effects. The general neoclassical
function does not provide adequate separation of effects5. Desirable properties
for the utility function are:
1. Strict quasiconcavity with at least weak concavity, for traditional reasons.
2. Homotheticity, so that there is no changing preference bias toward either
market or nonmarket income as utility increases.
3. Linearity in income with prices constant, so that diminishing marginal
utility of income effects, if any, appear as an assumption of the policy-
maker.
We shall confine our analysis to a CES utility function6, which meets the above
specifications:
u = (a(z - t(z) + g)^ + (1 - a)(u> - z)^ J °~1 (2)
where 0 < a < 1 and a > 0, ^ 1.
Choice of the CES function, rather than the much simpler Cobb-Douglas, pre-
empts queries as to whether the results depend on unit elasticity of substitution.
However we will sometimes use the equivalent Cobb-Douglas form when it is de-
sirable to show that a particular result holds also for unit elasticity.
Household Optimization
Households are assumed to choose z optimally, subject to 0 < z < u, given g
and the tax function t(z). We have
z*(w,g,t(z)) = max ( 0, . . „ —-—— 1 (3)
where 6 = ((1 — a)/a). There will be an interior optimum for w > (6/(1 —
t'(0)))a g, a lower boundary optimum otherwise. Note that an upper boundary
optimum {z = u) would require t = UJ + g > z and can be ruled out. The above
relationships also hold when we set <r = 1.
6The first version of this paper was written in terms of such a function.
6Feldstein (1973) uses the same utility function in conjunction with a nonlinear transfor-
mation relationship, but reaches no well defined conclusion as to the general shape of the
optimal tax function.
Note that a particular household's marginal choice is based on two properties of
the tax function, the total tax t(z*) at its optimal income and the marginal tax
rate m(z*) = t'(z*) at that income. If there is a full interior equilibrium, the
household's behavior near equilibrium z* can be analyzed as if it faced a simple
linear tax of the form t(z* + 6z) = t(z*) + m(z*) 6z. For a household at income
level z, the tax function can be seen as fully represented by the two variables
(parameters, from its point of view), t and m.
The shape of the tax schedule elsewhere than at z* is not entirely irrelevant,
however, since it can determine whether there is a better choice than that given
by the local marginal conditions. This is reflected in the appearance of m' in
the second order condition. We have
x~^ u± (4)
where x = z — t + g, so that d2u/dz2 < 0 for all m' > 0, but only for a limited
range of m' < 0.
It is easy to show that dz*/dm < 0, so that there is an upper limit to the value
of m for which a household with endowment u and grant g will generate any
taxable income. Since 2(0) = 0, this is given by
m(g, co) = m a x ( 0 , 1 — b I — J ) (5)
Note that, for given g and given w, m is smaller, the larger is a. Also, since
dz* /du> > 0, there is a lower limit to the value of w, given g, for which the
household will generate market income even at m = 0. We will discuss this
lower boundary optimum with z = 0 and du/dz < 0 at a later stage.
Given the tax structure (g,t(z)), there is a strictly monotonic one-to-one map-
ping between the endowment level to and the optimal market income z, provided
the household is at an interior optimum. Thus we can pick an endowment and
determine the market income level which is optimal for that endowment, given
the tax structure. This is the conventional approach. But we can just as well
pick an income level and determine the endowment level for which that income
is optimal, given the tax structure.
For reasons that will be obvious as the analysis progresses, z will be taken as
the independent variable here. For an interior optimum, u(z) is given by
with 0 < duj/dz < oo for all m < 1.
Using the relationship u(z), the utility function u(g,t(z),u>,z) becomes the in-
direct utility function v(g,t(z),z). This can be written v(g,t,m,z) because the
tax function is embodied in the two parameters t, m for a given value of z. Here
we have
where c = W ^ " 1 ) .
A major advantage of taking z as the independent variable is that, for given
z, we can treat t,m as parameters rather than functions. Finding the effect of
varying the tax parameters on v(g,t, m, z) gives us:
vt = -vg < 0 (9)
provided 2 — 2 + g > 0. The same sign relationships are easily shown to hold for
the Cobb-Douglas case (cr = 1).
Note that vm is positive because, with z held constant, a higher marginal tax
rate associates a higher endowment level with a given market income.
3. The Policy Maker
The policymaker's problem is to raise per capita revenue of g to be redistributed
uniformly as a grant g in cash or any other form in which it is a perfect substitute
for market goods. The revenue is to be obtained from a tax defined by a
smooth continuous function t(z) > 0 with t(zo) = 0 (where ZQ > 0 is the
lowest household income), but otherwise unrestricted. The tax function is to be
chosen so as to maximize a predetermined social welfare function. Two cases
will be considered
1. The per capita grant g is given, and the income tax must raise the required
revenue in an optimal way.
2. The tax-grant combination (g, t(z)) should solve the optimal redistribution
problem, the value of g being part of the solution.
The first case might be described as a second best optimum, except that an
income tax is itself a second best instrument of policy. The solutions must
satisfy the individual optimization constraints 0 < z < CJ and any constraints
imposed by the policymaker. The constraint placed on 2(2Q) is to prevent the
tax function solving for optimal redistribution when a solution for nonoptimal
g is sought.
The Welfare Function
The welfare function G(v) adopted by the policymaker is assumed to be anony-
mous and based solely on the level of a household's optimized utility level. The
policymaker is assumed to have full information as to household utility func-
tions.
To separate effects due to welfare concavity from other effects, we shall consider
two cases
1. An additive welfare function in which G(v) = v.
2. A strictly concave welfare function with G' > 0 and G" < 0.
The population of households is modelled as a one dimensional continuum.
The "natural" index variable is the endowment u>, with distribution given by a
smooth distribution function <£(u;) over (0 < U)Q,U>I < oo). The overall welfare
criterion is the mean value of G(v) taken over the whole population.
The Formal Optimizing Problem
If the problem was that of an optimal wealth tax, using u> as the independent
variable for the problem would be straightforward, since the tax function would
be defined over UJ and households would it would react to it as a function of
their wealth. But the tax function we seek must be perceived by households as
a function of income alone.
The solution adopted here is to treat income as the index variable and take the
income distribution as given. Under circumstances which give interior solutions
for household optimization, there is a unique positive monotonic relation be-
tween u> and z, so that the final distribution of z, given the tax function, will
have the same general pattern (of zeros, peaks, etc.) as the distribution of u>.
Since the purpose of the present analysis is to derive generic properties of the
tax function, not to solve for a given initial wealth distribution, this approach
is acceptable. Boundary cases can also be handled, with care.
Taking the index variable to be z, with distribution defined by the density
function f(z) and range (ZQ, Z{), the problem can be written as
maxW(<7) = / * G(v(g,t(z),m(z),z)) f(z)dz (11)
J ZQ
where the maximand is the mean welfare of the population.
The solution7 must satisfy the differential equations
t'(z) = m(z) (12)
#(*) = t(z)f(z) (13)
rKaneko (1981) proved the existence of a solution to the optimal tax problem for a quasi-
concave utility function with a strictly concave conversion of leisure into income, and a positive
monotonic welfare function, but not for a continuous distribution. Existence is assumed here.
and end-point conditions
t(zQ) = 0 (14)
t{Zl) free (15)
R(z0) = 0 (16)
R(Zl) = g (17)
R{z) is the contribution to net revenue per capita from taxes through income
level 2, with R(z\) is the mean revenue over all taxpayers.
The control variable is m, state variables are t,R, with the Hamiltonian
H(g,t(z), m(z),X{z),n(z)) = G (v(g,t, m, z)) f(z) + X(z) m{z) + p(z) t(z) f(z)
4. The Solution
Using standard maximum principle methods, the optimal trajectory for the state





Since t'(z) = m(z) and t(zo) = 0, the optimal solution is fully described by
m*(z), the optimal marginal tax rate schedule. However the properties and
economic interpretation of the optimal costate variables X*(z) and H*(z) are
critical in establishing the properties of the optimal tax schedule.
Henceforth it will be assumed that all variables are at optimal values unless it
is clear otherwise, so the asterisks will be dropped except that W* will always
be used to identify the optimal redistribution solution.
The Costate Variables
The costate variables must satisfy the adjoint equations
\t TT (f~1 I , , \ f /"1CA
fj,' = —HR — 0 ==> fi constant (20)
but we need further analysis to determine some important properties.
We can write
W(g) = / [H-Xt' - nRf]dz
J ZQ
pZ i
= / [H + X't-\-n'R]dz-\-X(zo)t(zQ)-X(z1)t(z1)-fig +
*J ZQ
after integration by parts and substituting g = R(z\).
Varying the end values t(zo), t(zi), R(0), gives:
6W(g) = f ' [Hm6m + (Ht + \')6t + (H
Jz0
+\{z0) 6t{z0) - X(zi) 6t(Zl) + n 6R(0) (21)







-^l = „ (24)
Since t is essentially unconstrained at z\, dW(g)/dt(zi) must vanish so that
A(*i) = 0 (25)
However t(zo) is not unconstrained in this way, since g was specifically intro-
duced so that we could fix t(zo) = 0. Thus dW(g)/dt(zo) need not vanish and
there is no direct transversality restriction on A(zo)-
Interpretation of the Costates
The economic interpretation of the costate variables A(z) and // is important
in understanding the model and in unravelling the story told by the optimal
conditions.
Since /i = dW(g)/dR(0), it measures the effect on optimal mean welfare of a
marginal variation in the starting value of the cumulated revenue R(z). R(z\) is
fixed at g, so that /z is the value in mean welfare terms of an exogenous addition
of $1 to the revenue "pot", enabling the tax function to be optimally reworked
to collect a mean of $1 less from taxpayers. The reason /i is constant is that
only the final revenue is relevant, not the stage at which it is collected. It is
obvious that // is essentially positive.
The interpretation of \{z) is less straightforward. We have A(z0) = dW{g)/dt{zo)
so that \(z0) measures the effect on mean welfare of raising the lowest tax
bracket from zero to $1 and then re-optimizing. Since other parameters (g in
particular) are held constant, taxes will be reduced for at least some incomes
above the lowest and the distribution will become marginally more regressive.
If t(zo) = 0 was itself an optimal outcome, then we would have A{ZQ) = 0, but
since t(zo) = 0 is an imposed constraint, the value (or even the sign) of \(ZQ) is
not immediate. We can, however, argue as follows:
1. If g is set at below the optimal redistribution level g* and the constraint
t(zo) = 0 is removed, the program will optimally redistribute by making t(zo)
negative. This implies X(ZQ) < 0 if t(zo) = 0 and g < g*.
2. If g > g* is above the optimal redistribution level, the opposite will be
true and thus X(ZQ) > 0. As we will show in Property P2 below, we cannot
have A(zo) > 0 and thus there is no regular solution for the case g > g*. This
is because we can only optimize mean welfare in this case by increasing t(zo)
above zero, which the constraints do not permit.
The interpretation of A(z) for z ^ ZQ is that it represents the effect on mean
welfare of an exogenously imposed change of $1 in the tax at income z, with
re-optimization restricted to changes in taxes for households with incomes above
z only. Note that one of the influences on the value of X{z) will be f(z) since
an increase in the tax on a sparsely populated income bracket will call for little
readjustment elsewhere. We expect to find X(z) < 0 except at the ends since,
if we interrupt the program at z and restart to optimize only from that point
on, the prior tax at z is now too high because it was designed to contribute to
households with incomes lower than z.
Optimal Redistribution
The optimal solution to the redistribution problem is found by treating g as a,
control parameter and optimizing for it:
W* = maxW(g)
9
Since W(g) is continuous in g for g < g*, we can take the derivative from below
to find the optimal condition






Since A(zi) = 0, d\V(g)/dg = — A(zo) and so the optimal condition is
X(z0) = 0 (27)
Note that this is consistent with the result given previously in the interpretation
of X{z).
Lower Boundary Optima
From (3), z0 > 0 only if w0 > u(g) = bffg/(l - m(zo))a, since t(z0) = 0. If
Wo < &(g), households with endowments in the set Q, = {u;|u;o < w < w(fif)} will
not attain an interior optimum, so that z — 0 for all a; £&.
Since w(flr) is increasing in g, the set is nonempty for sufficiently high levels of
redistribution (values of g) and for all g > 0 if UQ = 0. Since z = 0 for all w G ^,
the mapping between the distributions of w and 2 is not one-to-one in this range
as it is for interior optima.
Provided wo < &(g), define j3 as the proportion of the population in Q. Since /3
depends on the endowment distribution of the population as well as g, we shall
treat it as part of the assumed market income distribution.
The tax schedule is irrelevant to households in Q, the effect of redistribution
policy being determined by g, which becomes their entire disposable income.
Individual welfare is u(g,u>), (we do not use the v notation, since these are not
interior optima). Write the mean welfare of the population in the set as G°(g).
The policymaker's optimizing problem now has the form
max W(g)= rG(v(g,t(z),m(z),z))f(z)dz + (3G°(g) (28)
J Zn
For given g, the last term is simply a constant and only the integral term is
to be maximized. However there are three differences from the problem in the
interior optimum case
1. z0 = 0
2. JZ*f(z)dz=l-0
3. R(z1) = g/(1-P)
The last is because the taxpayers must accumulate enough revenue to distribute
g over those in & as well as themselves.
When we allow for the above changes and for the term in G°(g), the effect of
varying g can be shown to become
dg w " \1-F dg
Consider the second term on the right. dG°/dg and \i are both positive compa-
rable numbers, each measuring the effect of $1 on mean welfare, dG°/dg over
households in Q, // over the remainder. Because of the large weight given to /i
(between 2 and oo), we expect this to dominate and the expression in paren-
theses to be positive. Thus for optimal redistribution (dW(g)fdg — 0) we will
have A(0) < 0 rather than = 0 as in the interior optimum. Note that putting
j3 = 0 gives the interior optimum results.
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5. Properties of the Optimal Trajectory
The problem at this point is to translate the various necessary conditions for
that trajectory into a meaningful description of the required tax function. It is
first necessary to establish certain properties of the optimal solution.
P I . fi>0.
This follows directly from dyV*/dR(0) = //. An exogenous increase in revenue
will necessarily increase mean welfare.
P2. For an interior optimum of the policymaker's problem, X(z) < 0 for all z,
and X(z) = 0 only if f(z) = 0 or z is a boundary optimum for the household.
For an interior optimum to the main problem \{z) — —Gm(z)f(z) from (18).
An interior optimum for the household implies Gm(z) = G' vm > 0, from (10),
and f(z) > 0, so X(z) < 0 certainly and = 0 only if f(z) = 0. At a boundary
optimum for the household, Gm(z) = 0, so f(z) = 0 is no longer a necessary
condition.
P3 . X'(z) > 0 (< 0) only if (a) Gg > /i (< //) and (b) either d(Gm)/dz < 0 (>
0) or f'(z) < 0 (> 0)
The adjoint equation (19) can be expressed as
\'(z) = (G,(z)-M(z) (30)
since Gt = G'vt — —G'vg = —Gg(z), from (9). Condition (a) follows im-
mediately, and (b) follows directly from the first order optimum condition
X(z) = -Gm{z)f(z).
P4. Along any optimal trajectory in which all households are at interior optima,
Gg > /i, where Gg is the frequency weighted average of Gg along the trajectory.
Unless Gg{z) is constant, maxGg(z) > (j, > m i n G ^ ) . However if there is a
lower boundary optimum (the set & is nonempty), it is possible to have Gg(z) >
fi for all z.
From (30) above, we obtain
f'l(Gg(z)-rif(z)dz =
Gg-fi = -A(z o )>0 (31)
since X(zi) vanishes and X(z0) < 0 (from P2).
Now // = dW(g)/dRo is the increase in mean social welfare which would result
from an exogenous increase of $1 in per capita revenue, after optimally redis-
tributing the resulting saving in taxes. Gg{z) measures the social valuation of
the effect of $1 on a single household with income z.
For an interior optimum, $1 saved in taxes is equivalent to $1 increase in g. It
follows that we must have /i > Gg(z) for some z, since fi is the optimal mean
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welfare from an increase of $1 per capita. On the other hand, we must have
Gg(z) > // for some z, otherwise the optimum would be a Pareto improvement,
which is impossible for a pure redistribution without externalities.
For a lower boundary optimum, however, $1 saved in taxes is equivalent to
only $ (1 — /?) increase in g for the taxpayers, due to the payments to those
in the set Q. While it is true that fi > (1 — (3)Gg(z) for some z by the same
argument as above, this is consistent with Gg{z) > // everywhere for a large
enough (3 G (0,1).
P 5 . dGg(z)/dz < 0 unless m'(z) > 0. / / G" = 0, m'(z) > 0 implies
dGg(z)/dz > 0, but if G" < 0, dGg(z)Jdz > 0 only if m'(z) is sufficiently
large relative to \G"/G'\.
We have
dz ~ G {U)[lz + &(uj Tz
The second term is negative and its magnitude depends on the degree of con-
cavity \G"(u)/G'(u)\. If the welfare function is additive, the term vanishes and
dGg/dz — dvg/dz.
From (8) derive
(33)dz V ( l - r o ) ' - V (1-m)
so that dvg/dz has the same sign as m'. Note that this result holds for both
a > 1 and 0 < a < 1, and a similar result can be shown to hold for a — 1.
P 6 . dGm{z)/dz > 0 unless m' < 0 or G" < 0.
Using (10):
dvm baQ~^ L . /., . ba \ (z -t + fif)m/]
—7— = o- c — r—r 1 -(- 1 + — r-—r — rr— (34)dz (1 — m)17-1 [ \ b° + (1 - my-1 J ( 1 - m ) 2 J
where
so that vm is certainly increasing when m is nondecreasing, although it may not
be decreasing when m is decreasing.
The relationship between dGm/dz and dvm/dz is essentially the same as was
shown in (32) above between dGg/dz and dvg/dz. That is, Gm and vm move
in the same direction with additive welfare, but welfare concavity introduces a
downward bias to dGm/dz which increases with the degree of concavity.
P 7 . Either m(z) < 1 and t(z) < z for all z > 0 or t(z) = 0 for all z.
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From (5), z > 0 only if m(z) < m, and m < 1 if g > 0. But t(z) > 0 implies
g = 0 if and only if t(z) = 0 everywhere. Since t(zo) = 0, m < 1 everywhere
implies /(z) < 2 everywhere.
6. Some Basic Propositions
Proposition I. Any solution to the optimal redistributee income tax problem
in which all households are at interior optima will be characterized by a rising
marginal tax rate, the rate of rise being greater, the greater the degree of con-
cavity of the welfare function. The marginal rate will always remain strictly less
than unity, however. The class of distributions for which such a solution exists
is characterized by falling income density at the upper end and f(z) —*• 0 as
z —* z\. For a sufficiently concave welfare function, no solutions exist with all
households at interior optima. The results are independent of the elasticity of
substitution between market and nonmarket income.
For optimal redistribution, g — g* and \(ZQ) = A(zi) = 0, as shown earlier.
Now X(z) < 0 for ZQ < z < z\ from P2 and the assumptions on f(z), so that
the graph of X(z) must look like a slack clothesline, first falling from the zero
level then rising back to it. Thus \'{z) must first be negative, then positive.
From P3, this requires Gg{z) < fj, initially, then > fx, so Gg(z) must be rising.
From P5, a necessary condition for this is m'{z) > 0, whatever the elasticity of
substitution. This condition also sufficient if the welfare function is additive,
but if it is strictly concave m'(z) must not only be positive, but of sufficient
magnitude to outweigh the negative concavity term. However, m(z) < 1 even
at z\, from P7.
From P3, A'(.z) > 0, which characterises the latter part of the trajectory, requires
either f'(z) < 0 or falling Gm at that stage. But Gm is rising since m'{z) > 0,
from P6. f'(z) < 0 is consistent with the transversality requirement X(zi) = 0,
which can only be satisfied if f{z\) = 0 from P2.
If the concavity of the welfare function is such that Gg is falling throughout,
even if m' > 0, then it must be true that Gg > fi at the beginning and < fj, at
the end, so that A is first rising, then falling. But an interior optimum requires A
first falling, then rising, and so cannot be attained with this degree of concavity.
Although the pattern of the optimal tax is independent of the value of a, the
value of m(g,uj), the upper bound to m, varies inversely with a (from (5)). Thus
there is a presumption (but not a proof) that the optimal path of m(z) will be
lower, the higher the elasticity of substitution between market and nonmarket
income.
Proposition la. The conclusions of Proposition I hold for the problem of
optimizing the tax schedule given the level of g, provided g < g*.
If g < g*, \(zo) < 0 rather than = 0. An interior optimum requires \'(z) > 0
and thus Gg > fi in the final phase, while the phase with Gg < \i must precede
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it. Thus the pattern is essentially the same as in optimal redistribution. As
already pointed out, there is no interior optimum solution if g > g*.
Proposition II. If the degree of welfare concavity is too high to give an interior
optimum, optimal redistribution will give a lower boundary solution. It will be
optimal for those with the lowest endowments to produce no market income8.
Like the interior optimum, this will be characterized by a rising marginal tax
rate.
If the degree of welfare concavity is so high that Gg{z) is falling, then an interior
optimum does not exist because this implies Gg(z) < fi(z) and thus falling X(z)
near z\, where X(z) must be rising. But from P4 it is possible to have Gg(z) > \i
everywhere for a lower boundary optimum (0 > 0), so that Gg(z) > fi, hence
X(z) rising near z\, is consistent with falling Gg(z).
Since we must have minG^ < /i/(l — /?), the condition minG^ > \i can always
be satisfied for large enough /3 € (0,1). However there is an efficiency loss
at the lower boundary because the households are not able to reach an interior
optimum, so it is clear that the optimal solution will keep (3 as small as possible.
Since Gg is falling, this implies the rate of fall should kept small. From P5, this
implies m(z) rising.
Since Gg(z) > fi throughout, \{z) will be rising throughout. This is consistent
with \(ZQ) < 0 and \(zi) - 0.
Thus the optimal trajectory for high welfare concavity will be a lower boundary
optimum with the least endowed households receiving g as their only disposable
income, generating no market income of their own but using all their resources
for nonmarket income. As in the interior optimum case, the marginal tax rate
will be rising.
High concavity implies Gm(z) will be falling throughout, which is consistent
with \(z) falling thoughout (P3), so no restrictions on f{z) are necessary. It
must still be true that A(zi) = 0, however.
7. Concluding Remarks
The principal conclusion of this paper is that the generic pattern for the optimal
income tax schedule is that of a monononically rising marginal tax rate. This
is a kind of deja vue result, since it is what would have been expected prior to
the optimal tax literature of the 1970's and 1980's. That literature came to be
dominated by the top end zero marginal rate proposition, even though it often
seemed to be inconsistent with what the main optimization was indicating. The
proposition, which seemed to rule out precisely what this paper concludes, was
due to a misinterpretation of the formal results of optimization. Indeed, the
special contribution of this paper lies most of all in the careful interpretation
8
 A somewhat similar solution appears in Mirrlees (1971)
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of the optimum conditions, a somewhat Sherlock Holmesian process in which
every single mathematical property of the optimal trajectory, together with its
economic interpretation, is fitted into its place in the puzzle.
The generic pattern holds for all positive elasticities of substitution between
market and nonmarket income (or consumption and leisure), although we can
expect (this is not formally proved in the paper) that the optimal marginal
tax rate will be lower throughout the trajectory when the elasticity is higher.
The pattern holds for simple additive welfare functions as well as those with
strict concavity, but increased concavity will be associated with a more rapidly
rising marginal rate. Sufficiently concave welfare functions, and endowment
distributions with sufficient concentration at the low end, will make it optimal
to have bottom end households generate no market income.
The analysis has been confined to interior optima except at the bottom end of
the distribution, and is thus restricted to endowment (hence income) distribu-
tions in which density tails off to zero at the upper end. While this conforms
to normal expectations concerning such distributions, it does leave a loose end
lying about. And there are others.
Appendix
The Top End Marginal Rate
The proposition that the marginal tax rate should be zero on the highest income
is not supported by the present analysis. This appendix is designed to show
why common arguments do not hold for smooth neoclassical utility functions
and smooth continuous tax functions.
The key is our property P2, that top end households cannot be at interior
equilibria unless f{zi) = 0. We need confine our attention to interior equilibria
only, since all standard models require a one-to-one relationship between the
index variable (endowment, skill, or wage rate) and market income.
We shall consider the informal intuitive argument, and two formal arguments.
The Informal Argument
This can be stated as follows9: If z is the highest market income under a tax
system in which t(z) — i and m(z) = rh > 0, there is no welfare loss, and there
may be a gain, from changing the upper end tax schedule to t(z > z) = i, so
that m(z) — 0. The reasoning is that the individual at z retains his original
choice, but has an expanded opportunity because of the lowered marginal tax
rate, so he cannot lose and may gain, while his tax contribution remains at t so
that other taxpayers are left unaffected even if he gains.
9There are several variations on this argument, including a geometrical version in Seade
(1977). The version here is the simplest
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There is a counterargument, however. If the upper end individual has an actual
gain, it is because he can move to a preferred position with income z > z,
and this will always be true for a smooth neoclassical utility function and an
interior equilibrium. Consider the situation after the change, and now impose
tax on income above z at a marginal rate m in the range 0 < m < m. The
top end individual will be worse off that with m = 0, but his optimal income
will be greater than z, so that he will pay more than i and there is a welfare
gain to other taxpayers. Is overall welfare increased or decreased? It is precisely
the function of the optimizing program to determine this. Thus the upper end
marginal rate may or may not be zero, but this can be determined only from
the total trajectory, not from an informal argument concerning the top end in
isolation.
In any case, f{z\) — 0 implies that the top end is of negligible importance in
the overall welfare picture.
Phelps (1971)
Phelps is concerned with the optimal redistributive income tax under a Rawlsian
(maximin), rather than utilitarian, criterion. His Model B, in which the incentive
effects fall on leisure (rather than education as in Model A) is closest to that
given here. Furthermore, Phelps' Appendix reworks the problem in control
theory form, making the comparison even easier.




—— = q =mf<pt
dH
— = 0=1-F- mf<f>m + qdm
Phelps' q is the costate associated with t, thus corresponding to our A, and
<l>(t, m, y; g) (= n) is the inversion of the optimal income function y* = ip(t, m, n; g),
where y is earnings and n is the skill index. Variables m, f (= F') are essentially
the same as ours.
Phelps shows that <f>t < 0, <f>m > 0, so that q(y) < 0, the same as our A. Since
t(ymax) is taken to be unconstrained, the transversality condition q(ymax) = 0
must be satisfied. From the second equation, therefore, we must have mf<j>m = 0
at ymax- However we cannot conclude that m is necessarily zero, since the
relationship is also satisfied by / = 0 or <f)m = 0 (boundary optimum), consistent
with our findings.
Cooter (1978)
Cooter optimizes an additive social welfare function similar to ours, and uses a
control theory formulation, but his analysis is very different in many respects.
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We shall accept his analysis at face value and concentrate on his argument that
the marginal tax rate be zero at the top end.
Cooter derives ((iii) on p. 759)
T, _ A*{}
where A is the costate variable associated with aggregate tax revenue (corre-
sponding to our fi, and essentially positive), fi here is the costate associated
with v, the indirect utility as a state variable, and
sx- d
with
g — g{y,x,n) = argmax u{—z/n, x)
The independent variable is the skill index n.
Note that Cooter uses x (final consumption) as the control, rather than the
tax T — z — x itself. He then argues that the transversality condition /i = 0
necessarily implies X" = 0.
However the derivation given is incomplete, since #2 = dz/dx — 1/(1 — T").
Fully solving for X" gives
rp, /*{•}
- A / + /!{•}
Then if / ^ 0, /i = 0 implies V = 0, but / = 0 implies V - 1 if /i # 0 and
is consistent with any value of T" for /i = 0. Again, the argument that the
transversality condition necessarily implies X" = 0 fails to hold, and the actual
result is consistent with the current paper.
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